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SURROGACY IN CALIFORNIA: 
GENETIC AND GESTATIONAL 
RIGHTS 
Dale Elizabeth Lawrence* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since it began over a decade ago, surrogacy 1 has become a 
viable alternative means of reproduction and is utilized by an 
increasing number of infertile couples.2 However, the debate 
over the legality and enforceability of surrogate parenting agree-
ments continues unabated in the courts and state legislatures.3 
As of this publication, the California State Legislature- has not 
enacted any pertinent legislation, thus leaving resolution of sur-
rogacy disputes to the judiciary. An advisory panel' was ap-
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992; B.A., University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley. 
1. This term is used to describe a surrogate parenting agreement whereby a woman 
agrees to bear the child of a man not her husband, generally through artificial insemina-
tion, and to relinquish all parental rights upon the birth of the child to the man and his 
wife. M. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 6 (1988) [hereinafter FIELD). The surrogate 
mother may be genetically related to the child by providing the ovum herself (traditional 
surrogacy) or she may serve only as the gestational mother, the embryo having been 
produced through in vitro fertilization of the couple's egg and sperm and subsequently 
implanted in the gestational mother (gestational surrogacy). 
2. The Center for Surrogate Parenting in Los Angeles, California, estimates there 
have been approximately 250 surrogate births in California since 1978 involving all pro-
fessional surrogacy programs, and an additional 250 surrogate births have occurred in 
California privately without the aid of a professional program. Additionally, this Center 
estimates that approximately 2,000 surrogate births have occurred nationwide utilizing 
professional programs since approximately 1975 and another 2,000 have resulted nation-
wide privately. MINORITY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE 
COMM. ON SURROGATE PARENTING, at M7-M8 (July 1990) [hereinafter MINORITY REPORT). 
3. For the legislative years 1987 through 1989, legislative initiatives concerning sur-
rogacy were introduced in 39 states and the District of Columbia. 15 STATE LEGIS. REP. 
OF THE NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, No.2, at 1 (Jan. 1990) [hereinafter STATE 
LEGIS. REP.). 
4. The advisory panel was composed of predominantly legal and medical experts, as 
525 
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pointed to provide recommendations on surrogate parenting to 
assist the Joint Committee on Surrogate Parenting in report'ing 
to the California State Legislature. 1I As a result of the Final Re-
port of the Advisory Panel to the Joint Legislative Committee 
on Surrogate Parenting, surrogacy bills are being introduced 
during the 1991-1992 legislative year.8 
Surrogacy presents legal, ethical and social issues that must 
be resolved legislatively in order to provide the judiciary and cit-
izens with guidelines. Such issues include the legality and en-
forceability of surrogate parenting agreements; the scope of re-
productive choice constitutionally; ethical concerns regarding 
the potential for exploitation; the social benefits and harms cre-
ated by the practice of surrogacy; parental status and rights of 
the parties; and state versus federal legislation. 
Part I of this article contrasts the surrogacy controversy in 
California with the legislative response nationwide by examining 
the various underlying issues that must necessarily be consid-
ered by state legislatures.7 Although the surrogacy controversy 
raises issues that concern the nation and society as a whole, it 
should be resolved independently by each state's legislature. At 
the center of the debate lies the question of whether the practice 
of surrogacy is detrimental or beneficial to the contracting par-
ties and to society. 
Part II examines a California judicial decision8 of first im-
pression and compares it to other states' judicial decisions on 
surrogacy.9 The California decision is indicative of the need for 
legislation in the state, as its results were not reached through 
an application of current laws. tO Furthermore, the decision and 
several legislative proposals reflect the conflict on surrogacy 
within the state. While its holding is supported by recently in-
well as a clinical licensed social worker and a professor of philosophy. FINAL REPORT-OF 
THE ADVISORY PANEL TO THE JOINT LEGIS. COMM. ON SURROGATE PARENTING, at 32-37 
(July 1990) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT). 
5. Id. at 2. 
6. L.A. Daily Journal, July 18, 1990, at 5, col. 2. See infra notes 52-57 and accom-
panying text (discussing recently introduced legislation in California). 
7. See infra notes 25-82 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 135-206 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 95-128 and accompanying text. 
lO. See infra note 19. 
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troduced legislation,ll it is directly at odds with the recom-
mended legislation of the Advisory Panel's Final Report to the 
Joint Legislative Committee on Surrogate Parenting.12 Legisla-
tion will serve to clarify the rights of parties to a surrogate 
parenting agreement. 
Ultimately the surrogacy issue is one of public policy. As of 
this publication, Congress has not enacted any national legisla-
tion concerning surrogate parenting agreements, but has instead 
left resolution of the myriad of issues to individual state courts 
and legislatures. As a paramount public policy issue, resolution 
of the surrogacy controversy should be achieved through the en-
actment of state legislation. This Article concludes that such leg-
islation should regulate surrogate parenting agreements rather 
than completely prohibit these arrangements. It is in the best 
interests of California and all parties involved to provide legisla-
tive regulatory guidelines as a response to the increasing practice 
of surrogacy. By permitting individuals to enter into surrogate 
parenting agreements, establishing presumptions of the legal re-
lationships and providing for professional and court supervision, 
regulatory guidelines would protect individual Constitutional 
rights while minimizing the risk of exploitation. 
BACKGROUND 
A significant majority of the surrogacy cases in the courts 
thus far have involved what is termed "traditional surrogacy,"13 
in which a "surrogate mother" agrees to be artificially insemi-
nated with the sperm of a man whose wife is infertile.14 The 
agreement provides that she is to carry the child to term and 
upon giving birth will relinquish all her parental rights, thus al-
lowing the biological father's wife to adopt the child. 11i However, 
11. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 95-128 and accompanying text. 
14. In actuality, "surrogate mother" is a misnomer in traditional surrogacy, as the 
woman so termed is the genetic mother. However, this term has consistently been used 
to denote the woman who agrees to bear a child for a man not her husband, whether she 
is the genetic mother or the gestational mother. In this article, "surrogate mother" will 
be used when referring to a woman who serves as a surrogate in traditional surrogacy 
and is therefore also the genetic mother. 
15. FIELD, supra note I, at 6. 
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"gestational 'surrogacy"16 has now become an alternative means 
of reproduction for infertile couples. In this process, the egg is 
fertilized in vitro17 and later implanted in a surrogate who be-
comes the gestational mother.ls She is therefore not genetically 
related to the fetus and intends to relinquish the child at birth 
to the couple. With gestational surrogacy, the question becomes 
who is the mother? Is it the gestational mother or the woman 
who provided the egg? These questions do not have clear legisla-
tive answers in California. Currently California state law pro-
vides that the natural mother is the one who has given birth to 
the child. 19 Due to the potential for a variety of roles of parties 
in a surrogacy arrangement,20 legislation must be enacted to en-
compass each possibility. Until each state or the federal govern-
ment has enacted legislation dealing with surrogacy specifically, 
parties to a surrogate parenting agreement cannot be sure of 
their respective rights should a dispute arise. 
I. LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY 
Recent reports21 conducted and legislation introduced in 
California22 and in other states23 indicate that the public policy 
16. In a "gestational surrogacy" arrangement, the surrogate is not genetically related 
to the child. In this article, "gestational mother" will be used when referring to a woman 
who is not genetically related to the fetus but has agreed to carry the infertile couple's 
embryo to term. 
17. In vitro fertilization usually refers to the process whereby a doctor stimulates 
the development of eggs through the use of hormones, removes the eggs in a procedure 
called laparoscopy, and fertilizes them in a petri dish prior to implantation. T. SHANNON, 
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE ETHICS OF USING HUMAN BEINGS 4-5 (1988) [hereinafter 
SHANNON]. 
18. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4. 
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(1) (West 1983). The statute provides that "the natural 
mother ... may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child .... " 
20. A child may have numerous parents: There is the potential for a genetic mother, 
gestational mother, rearing mother, genetic father and rearing father. SHANNON, supra 
note 17, at 79-80. 
21. STATE LEGIS. REP., supra note 3. This report reviews surrogate parenting con-
tract legislation enacted during the 1987, 1988 and 1989 legislative sessions; FINAL RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 19-31 sets forth the advisory panel's recommendations for legisla-
tion in California. 
22. See infra note 24 (review of legislation introduced in California over the last ten 
years). 
23. See STATE LEGIS. REP., supra note 3, at 7-10 (A summary of state bill introduc-
tions on surrogate parenting contracts. This report indicates that for the 1987-1989 legis-
lative sessions there were a total of 205 bills introduced to prohibit, regulate or study 
surrogacy). 
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issues surrounding surrogacy are being examined throughout the 
country. 
A. SURROGACY IN CALIFORNIA 
Surrogacy legislation has been introduced in California peri-
odically over the past decade.24 These bills ranged from regula-
tion of the practice to express prohibition of commercial 
su!rogacy. 
The California Legislature analyzed the issues surrounding 
the surrogacy debate through the establishment of an advisory 
pane1.211 This panel submitted its Final Report to the Joint Leg-
islative Committee on Surrogate Parenting26 in July 1990.27 The 
State Legislature will examine surrogacy legislation based upon 
bills introduced by the Joint Committee's members.28 In its re-
24. A.B. 365 and A.B. 3771 were introduced in 1981-82 by Los Angeles Democrat 
Assemblyman Mike Roos. These bills would have provided guidelines for surrogate 
parenting contracts. In particular, A.B. 3771 would have restricted the use of surrogate 
contracts to infertile couples only; A.B. 1707 was introduced in 1985-86 by former As-
semblywoman Jean M. Duffy (D-Citrus Heights). The bill was designed to authorize and 
regulate surrogate arrangements. The bill attempted to deal with the rights and respon-
sibilities of parties to surrogate contracts; A.B. 2304 and A.B. 2404 were introduced in 
1987 by the late Assemblyman Richard Longshore (R-Westminster). These were two re-
lated measures. One would have prohibited a woman from relinquishing custody of her 
child before it was born and the other would have voided surrogacy contracts that re-
quired unnecessary tests, such as one to determine the sex of an unborn child; S. 2635 
was introduced by Senator Diane Watson (D-Los Angeles) in 1988 and would have estab-
lished parental relationships and regulated surrogacy; A.B. 3200 was introduced in 1988 
by Assemblywoman Sunny Mojonnier (R-San Diego). This bill sought to establish that 
the woman who gives birth to a child is the legal mother of that child, regardless of the 
child's genetic background. It would also expressly prohibit contract parenting for a fee; 
A.B. 2100 was introduced in 1989 also by Assemblywoman Mojonnier. This bill stated 
that contracts to bear a child are against public policy and are void and unenforceable. 
L. A. Daily Journal, July 14, 1988, at 1, col. 6. The Alternative Reproduction Act of 1989 
was introduced by Assemblyman Terry B. Friedman (D-Sherman Oaks). This bill would 
have authorized surrogacy procedures and enforcement of surrogate contracts and egg 
donor contracts. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at M82-M99. 
25. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
26. The Joint Committee on Surrogate Parenting's [hereinafter Joint Committee) 
members were Assemblywoman Sunny Mojonnier, Chair; Senator Robert Presley, Vice 
Chair; Senator Ed Davis; Senator Diane Watson; Assemblyman Mike Roos; and Assem-
blywoman Jackie Speier. 
27. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4. 
28. ACR-l71 created the Joint Committee on Surrogate Parenting, and directed and 
authorized the Joint Committee to ascertain, study and critically analyze materials con-
cerning commercial and noncommercial parenting. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEG-
ISLATURES: BILL INTRODUCTIONS IN 1988 LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS RELATING TO SURROGACY 
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port to the Joint Committee, the Majority Report of the Advi-
sory Panel29 recommended legislation prohibiting commercial 
surrogacy in California and imposing criminal sanctions for par-
ticipation in surrogacy arrangements.30 It based these recom-
mendations upon a comparison between adoption issues and 
their relationship to surrogacy,31 finding that legalized paid sur-
rogacy will have negative effects on the children involved, surro-
gates and society.32 However, the Minority Report of the Advi-
sory Panel33 recommended that legislation be enacted to clarify 
the legality of surrogate parenting agreements, urging that they 
be considered void, and that where a dispute arises, custody of 
the child should be determined based upon a best interest analy-
sis.34 Members of the Minority Report argued that there is no 
empirical evidence to indicate that significant harm has been 
suffered by women who have been surrogate mothers.311 They 
also asserted that there is no evidence to suggest significant 
harm to the siblings of children born by surrogates.36 
The dissenting viewpoints expressed in the Minority Report 
are indicative of the controversy nationwide. Proponents of sur-
CONTRACTS. 
29. Twelve members of the Advisory Panel supported the FINAL REPORT, while the 
dissenting Minority Report was ascribed to by six members. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, 
at M1. 
30. The Advisory Panel Report recommends the following: 
Amend CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 to prohibit payment to a surrogate mother for other 
than expenses allowed in all other adoption procedures; add to CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) 
to prohibit commercial surrogacy agencies; amend CAL. CIV. CODE § 224(p) to prohibit 
advertising for surrogacy; amend CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 to designate as the natural father 
the party of a surrogate parenting agreement who donates his semen for artificial insemi-
nation; amend CAL. CIV. CODE § 7015 to provide that when ova or embryos have come 
from a woman other than the one who gives birth, the gestating woman is irrebuttably 
presumed to be the natural mother; amend CAL. CIV. CODE § 1669 to make surrogate 
mother agreements void and unenforceable. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1, 20-31. 
31. [d. at 7-17. 
32. [d. 
33. MINORITY REPORT, supra note 2. 
34. [d. at M3. The Minority Report additionally concluded that regulatory means 
should be used to protect the interests of the parties involved in surrogacy arrangements, 
rather than criminalizing all surrogate-related activities. [d. 
35. [d. at MI5-MI7. (discussion of several studies that have been conducted indicat-
ing no significant harm has been caused to surrogate mothers). 
36. [d. at MI8-MI9. Nevertheless, the Minority Report concedes that very little 
data exists regarding the surrogate mother's children and their reactions to the surrogate 
pregnancy and relinquishment of the resulting child to the biological father and his wife. 
[d. at M18. 
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rogacy rely on Constitutional principles37 in support of an indi-
vidual's right to pursue new reproductive technologies without 
interference from the government. The Constitutional right of 
privacy,38 which includes the right to procreative choice,39 is as-
serted as an argument in support of surrogacy.40 The Constitu-
tional guarantees of equal protection and due process are also 
raised in support of surrogacy agreements. Infertile couples con-
tend that based upon these constitutional principles, all individ-
uals should have equal access to available reproductive technolo-
gies to overcome infertility. The basis for the current assertion 
of these constitutional rights arose in earlier cases affirming cer-
tain procreative rights.41 
The Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut42 affirmed 
the right of a married couple to use contraceptives, based on its 
finding that the right of privacy is a fundamental Constitutional 
guarantee.43 It is argued that as a fundamental right, the right of 
privacy, including the right to procreative choice!4 empowers in-
dividuals to use alternative methods of reproduction in their 
pursuit of this right.41i Whether or not the right to procreative 
choice actually extends to the use of a surrogate remains at 
issue. 
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The 14th amendment provides: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
38. The Constitutional right of privacy is an implied right under the U.S. Constitu-
tion. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. However, the right of privacy under the California 
Constitution is an express right. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 1 (1974): "All people are by 
nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing 
and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." (emphasis added). 
39. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977); Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965); 
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 836, 263 Cal. 
Rptr. 46, 47 (1989); Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal.3d 252, 262, 
625 P.2d 779, 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871 (1981). 
40. See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text. 
41. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
43. Id. at 485. 
44. See supra note 39. 
45. See supra note 39. 
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In Eisenstadt v. Baird,46 the Supreme Court expanded this 
right of procreative choice by upholding a single person's right 
to use contraceptives, as guaranteed by the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Proponents of surrogacy 
claim that equal protection guarantees prohibit arbitrarily 
drawn distinctions between persons who are similarly situated,48 
and therefore a man is being denied equal protection when he is 
prohibited from reproducing through a surrogacy arrangement.49 
Since couples are allowed to have the biological child of the wo-
man through artificial insemination if the man is sterile, banning 
surrogacy would prohibit couples from having the biological 
child of the man when the woman is infertile. lio Opponents con-
tend, however, that due to the differences in the nature and ex-
tent of the responsibility involved, the state may distinguish be-
tween surrogacy and artificial insemination. iiI 
Legislation recently introduced in Californiali2 seeks to pro-
vide guidance to the judiciary in resolving surrogacy disputes. 
This bill provides that contracts which attempt to establish par-
ent and child relationships are void as a matter of public pol-
icy.lis For third-party assisted childbearing,M parent and child 
relationships are to be governed by an amendment to the Civil 
Code. 1i1i 
The amended statute would require that all parties be in-
formed, orally and in writing, of the legal effect of the statute 
and must consent in writing.1i6 This writing would indicate the 
46. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
47. See supra note 37. 
48. FIELD, supra note I, at 47. 
49.Id. 
50. Id. This argument addresses the use of artificial insemination by donor (AID), 
rather than artificial insemination by husband (AIH). 
51. Id .. at 48. 
52. S.B. 937 (introduced by Senator Watson, March 1991). 
53. S.B. 937, § 2. 
54. The term "third-party assisted childbearing" describes arrangements in which a 
third party is utilized to assist in childbearing. The methods encompassed in the statute 
include the donation of sperm, the donation of ovum, or the donation of gestational abil-
ities. Id. at § 1(a). 
55. S.B. 937, § 3. 
56. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 would be amended to read in pertinent part: 
(f) The consent of all parties is required in all cases of third-
party assisted childbearing pursuant to this section, and at 
least 30 days prior to an attempt to conceive a child, the hus-
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss3/3
1991] SURROGACY IN CALIFORNIA 533 
specific intent of the parties regarding custody of a child con-
ceived through third-party assisted childbearing.1I7 
By providing that contracts attempting to establish parent 
and child relationships are void as a matter of public policy, the 
statute deems that surrender of a child cannot be controlled ex-
clusively by the terms of the contract. Nevertheless, the written 
consent reflecting the specific intent of the parties attempts to 
accomplish the same result of awarding custody to the intended 
parents. Presumably factors other than the intent evidenced in 
the writing would be considered by the court in determining 
custody. 
Until legislation is enacted which establishes the rights of 
the parties to a surrogacy agreement, current law in California 
does not adequately address such arrangements. Only case law 
provides guidance in resolving certain surrogacy agreements. 
B. STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY NATIONWIDE 
As California seeks a solution to the surrogacy controversy, 
other states have addressed surrogacy legislatively and provide 
insight into the options available. 
Numerous state legislatures have introduced or enacted sur-
rogacy legislation in recent years. 1I8 During the legislative ses-
band and wife and the third party providing either semen, 
ovum, or gestational abilities, shall be informed, orally and in 
writing, of the legal effect of this section upon the parent and 
child relationships involved, and shall consent in writing, indi-
cating, among other things, all of the following: 
(1) The specific intent of the parties regarding who shall 
have custody of the child thereby conceived. 
(2) The knowledge of the parties of the legal effect of this 
section upon the parent and child relationships created by 
their participation in third-party assisted childbearing. 
(Presumably an attorney would inform the parties of the legal effect of the statute, 
although the proposed statutory amendment does not recommend the use of indepen-
dent counsel for the third party donating sperm, ovum or gestational abilities). 
57. [d. 
58. The breakdown of state bill introductions on surrogate parenting contracts for 
1987-1989 is as follows: 72 bills in 1987; 70 bills in 1988; and 63 bills in 1989. Only eleven 
states had no legislative activity during these years, which indicates the increasing atten-
tion being given to surrogacy throughout the states. STATE LEGIS. REP., supra note 3, at 
10. 
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sions of 1987 through 1989, twelve states enacted legislation 
dealing with surrogate parenting contracts.1I9 In 1990, only one 
state enacted surrogacy legislation.60 
The legislation ranges from unenforceability of surrogate 
parenting agreements with criminal penalties for any violations61 
to legal enforceability of the practice.62 While a number of states 
permit surrogate arrangements without imposing criminal sanc-
tions, these states provide that ultimately the contracts are void 
and unenforceable if a dispute arises among the parties.63 
Only one state, Arkansas, provides that a child born of a 
surrogate arrangement is legally the child of the party con-
tracting with the surrogate mother.6" However, because the Ar-
kansas statute does not address the commercial aspects of a sur-
rogate parenting agreement, one must look to the state's child 
selling statutes and adoption laws to determine if commercial 
surrogate parenting agreements are legally enforceable.611 Other 
than the costs of medical and legal expenses, paying a fee to the 
biological mother for her consent to adoption is prohibited by 
the child selling statutes.66 Thus commercial surrogacy appears 
59. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (Supp. 1990); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1991); 
FLA. STAT. § 63.212 (1985 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-1-3 to -2-3 (West Supp. 
1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1990); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West Supp. 1991); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 722.851 to .861 
(West Supp. 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287 
(Michie Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to -07 (Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-7-204 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210 to .260 (Supp. 1991). 
60. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-8 (Supp. 1990). 
61. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (MichielBobbs-MerrillI982 & Supp. 1990); MICH. 
COMPo LAWS §§ 722.851 to .861 (West Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1990); 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210 to .260 (Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-8 (Supp. 
1990). 
62. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1991). 
63. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-1-3 to -2-3 (West Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
9:2713 (West Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-
18-01 to -07 (Supp. 1989). 
64. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-1O-201(b) (1991) states in pertinent part: 
[I)n the case of a surrogate mother. . . the child shall be that 
of: (1) the biological father and the woman intended to be the 
mother if the biological father is married; or (2) the biological 
father only if unmarried; or (3) the woman intended to be the 
mother in cases of a surrogate mother when an anonymous do-
nor's sperm was utilized for artificial insemination. 
65. STATE LEGIS. REP., supra note 3, at 1. 
66. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-9-206(c) (1991) provides: "Under no circumstances maya 
parent or guardian of a minor receive a fee, compensation, or any other thing of value as 
10
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contrary to the child selling statutes in Arkansas.67 
Nevada's legislation on adoption includes a subsection relat-
ing to surrogacy, but it is not clear if a surrogate parenting con-
tract ultimately will be upheld.68 The courts have not yet deter-
mined if the adoption law is in conflict with Nevada's child 
selling statutes. Thus it is unknown whether or not such con-
tracts can be enforced. 
In Florida, the statute permits individuals to enter into 
preplanned adoption arrangements, but only permits payment of 
related and reasonable legal, medical, psychiatric and living ex-
penses of the volunteer mother.69 
The first state to adopt the Uniform Status of Children of 
Assisted Conception Act7° is North Dakota.71 Any contract 
wherein a woman agrees to relinquish her rights and duties as a 
parent of a child conceived through assisted conception is void, 
in which case the surrogate is legally the mother of a resulting 
child.72 Although most states that have enacted surrogacy legis-
a consideration for the relinquishment of a minor for adoption .... " 
67. To date there have been no legal disputes over surrogacy contracts in the Arkan-
sas courts. It therefore is not yet known if a court will hold such a contact enforceable, 
especially in light of the child selling statutes. 
68. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(5) (Michie Supp. 1989) provides that "[t]he pro-
visions of this section do not apply if a woman enters into a lawful contract to act as a 
surrogate, be inseminated and give birth to the child of a man who is not her husband." 
69. FLA. STAT. § 63.212 (1985 & Supp. 1991). Payments to brokers as a finder's fee 
are also prohibited. The preplanned adoption agreement must include numerous provi-
sions, including a right of rescission by the volunteer mother any time within seven days 
after the birth of the child. Finally, a violator of a statutory provision is guilty of a felony 
of the third degree, which carries penalties up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment up to five 
years. [d. 
70. This Act was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws. North Dakota adopted "Alternative B" of the Uniform Act. STATE LEGIS. 
REP., supra note 3, at 4. 
71. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to -07 (Supp. 1989). N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 
(Supp. 1989) pertains to surrogate agreements: 
Any agreement in which a woman agrees to become a surro-
gate or to relinquish her rights and duties as parent of a child 
conceived through assisted conception is void. The surrogate, 
however, is the mother of a resulting child and the surrogate's 
husband, if a party to the agreement, is the father of the child. 
If the surrogate's husband is not a party to the agreement or 
the surrogate is unmarried, paternity of the child is governed 
by chapter 14-17. 
72. [d. The North Dakota child selling statute specifically excludes surrogate 
11
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lation appear to permit voluntary surrogacy as opposed to paid 
surrogacy, Arizona makes all surrogate parenting contracts 
illegal. 73 
Indiana,74 Louisiana7& and Nebraska76 declare surrogate 
mother contracts. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-05 (Supp. 1989). Thus while payment to 
the surrogate is not specifically prohibited, a surrogate parenting contract cannot be en· 
forced if there is a dispute between the parties. 
73. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (Supp. 1990) states: 
A. No person may enter into, induce, arrange, procure or oth· 
erwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage 
contract. 
B. A surrogate is the legal mother of a child born as a result of 
a surrogate parentage contract and is entitled to custody of 
that child. 
C. If the mother of a child born as a result of a surrogate con· 
tract is married, her husband is presumed to be the legal fa· 
ther of the child. This presumption is rebuttable. 
D. For the purposes of this section, 'surrogate parentage con· 
tract' means a contract, agreement or arrangement in which a 
woman agrees to the implantation of an embryo not related to 
that woman or agrees to conceive a child through natural or 
artificial insemination and to voluntarily relinquish her paren· 
tal rights to the child. 
(This statute does not appear to distinguish between paid and voluntary surrogacy 
arrangements). 
74. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-1-3 to -2-3 (West Supp. 1990). IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1 
(West Supp. 1990) declares that: 
[I)t is against. public policy to enforce any term of a surrogate 
agreement that requires a surrogate to do any of the following: 
(1) Provide a gamete to conceive a child. 
(2) Become pregnant. 
(3) Consent to undergo or undergo an abortion. 
(4) Undergo medical or psychological treatment or 
examination. 
(5) Use a substance or engage in activity only in accordance 
with the demands of another person. 
(6) Waive parental rights or duties to a child. 
(7) Terminate care, custody, or control of a child. 
(8) Consent to a stepparent adoption under IC 31-3-1. 
Additionally, IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-2 (West Supp. 1990) provides that such a surro· 
gate agreement is void. This statute does not appear to distinguish between voluntary 
and paid surrogacy arrangements. 
75. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713(A) (West Supp. 1991) states that "A contract for 
surrogate motherhood. . . shall be absolutely null and shall be void and unenforceable 
as contrary to public policy." However, there are no penalties for violations of the 
statute. 
76. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1989) provides: 
(1) A surrogate parenthood contract entered into shall be void 
and unenforceable. The biological father of a child born pur· 
suant to such a contract shall have all the rights and obliga· 
tions imposed by law with respect to such child. 
12
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parenting contracts to be against public policy and therefore 
void and unenforceable. Such statutes do not penalize those par-
ticipating in surrogate parenting agreements, but nevertheless 
alert the parties that these contracts are unenforceable should a 
dispute arise as to custody of the child. As a result, individuals 
in these states are deterred from entering into surrogacy agree-
ments initially. 
The final category of surrogate parenting statutes imposes 
criminal sanctions against anyone involved in a commercial sur-
rogate parenting agreement.77 Within this group of statutes, 
however, the criminal classifications range from a misdemeanor 
to a felony with a penalty of up to $50,000 and/or imprisonment. 
Utah,78 Washington,79 Kentucky80 and Michigan81 prohibit com-
(2) For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise 
requires, a surrogate parenthood contract shall mean a con-
tract by which a woman is to be compensated for bearing a 
child of a man who is not her husband. 
This statute defines such a contract as one in which the surrogate mother is to be com-
pensated and does not address voluntary surrogacy. 
77. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill1982 & Supp. 1990); MICH. 
COMPo LAWS §§ 722.851 to .861 (West Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1990); 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210 to .260 (Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B (Supp. 
1990). 
78. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1990). The statute declares that: 
(l)(a) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may be 
a party to a contract for profit or gain in which a woman 
agrees to undergo artificial insemination or other procedures 
and subsequently terminate her parental rights to a child born 
as a result. 
(b) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may facili-
tate a contract prohibited by Subsection (1). 
(c) Contracts or agreements entered into in violation of this 
section are null and void, and unenforceable as contrary to 
public policy. 
(d) A violation of this subsection is a class A misdemeanor. 
Although there are no penalties for entering into a voluntary agreement, it is neverthe-
less unenforceable. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(2) (1990). Finally, if a custody dispute 
arises under either of the above sections, the court is not bound by the contract terms, 
but is to make its custody decision based solely on the best interests of the child. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(b) (1990). 
79. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210 to .260 (Supp. 1991). WASH. REV. CODE § 
26.26.240 (Supp. 1991) declares that: "A surrogate parentage contract entered into for 
compensation, whether executed in the state of Washington or in another jurisdiction, 
shall be void and unenforceable in the state of Washington as contrary to public policy." 
Additionally, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.250 (Supp. 1991) provides: "Any person, organi-
zation, or agency who intentionally violates any provision . . . shall be guilty of a gross 
misdemeanor." If a custody dispute arises between the parties, the party having physical 
custody of the child may retain physical custody until the court orders otherwise, and 
13
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mercial surrogate parenting agreements by declaring them void 
and unenforceable, and provide for criminal penalties of fines 
and/or imprisonment. New Hampshire allows and regulates sur-
rogacy agreements, but one is guilty of a misdemeanor if com-
pensation other than reasonable and related medical, legal, psy-
chological and living expenses is involved.82 
the court will award legal custody of the child based on factors weighing the best inter· 
ests of the child pursuant to the Washington child custody statutes. WASH. REV. CODE § 
26.26.260 (Supp. 1991). 
80. Kv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1990). This 
statute provides in pertinent part: 
(3) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary shall be a 
party to a contract or agreement which would compensate a 
woman for her artificial insemination and subsequent termina-
tion of parental rights to a child born as a result of that artifi-
cial insemination. No person, agency, institution or intermedi-
ary shall receive compensation for the facilitation of contracts 
or agreements as proscribed by this subsection. Contracts or 
agreements entered into in violation of this subsection shall be 
void. 
In a separate statute, penalties are set for providing compensation to a surrogate mother 
or for acting as a broker between the parties to a surrogacy arrangement. A violation of 
this provision results in a fine of $500 to $2,000 or imprisonment for not more than six 
months, or both. Kv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.990(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 
1990). 
81. MICH. COMPo LAWS §§ 722.851 to .863 (West Supp. 1990). MICH. COMPo LAWS § 
722.855 (West Supp. 1990) provides: "A surrogate parentage contract is void and unen-
forceable as contrary to public policy." Furthermore, any person who enters into or ar-
ranges a surrogate parentage contract for compensation is guilty of a crime. A participat-
ing party is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $10,000 or imprisonment 
for not more than one year, or both. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 722.859(2). However, anyone 
other than a participating party who assists in the formation of a surrogate parentage 
contract for compensation is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of up to $50,000 or 
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 722.859(3). If a 
dispute arises concerning custody of the child, the party having physical custody may 
retain physical custody until the circuit court orders otherwise. This court will then 
award legal custody of the child based on a best interest determination. MICH. COMPo 
LAWS § 722.861. 
82. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B (Supp. 1990). N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 
(Supp. 1990) provides in relevant part: 
I. A surrogate arrangement is lawful only if it conforms to the 
requirements of this subdivision, and if, before the procedure 
to impregnate the surrogate: 
(a) The health care provider performing the procedure re-
ceives written certification that the parties successfully com-
pleted the medical and nonmedical evaluations and counseling 
(b) The surrogate arrangement has been judicially 
preauthorized . . . . 
(c) All parties to the surrogacy contract provide the health 
care provider performing the procedure with written indica-
14
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While the states legislating surrogacy are few in number, 
they indicate the growing desire of legislatures to enact laws re-
lating specifically to surrogacy. Application of adoption laws to . 
surrogacy does not adequately take into consideration the differ-
ences in the two arrangements. Agreements involving new repro-
ductive technologies and third-party assistance in childbearing 
take place prior to conception, while adoption is a subsequent 
change in the parental status of the parties after the birth of a 
child. 
Legislatures have several options. One choice is to prohibit 
surrogacy entirely and provide for criminal sanctions. However, 
criminalization of surrogate parenting agreements may have the 
unfortunate result of either driving the practice underground or 
encouraging prospective parents to relocate to states permitting 
surrogate parent agreements. 
Another option is to provide for regulation of the practice. 
The state can ensure that the parties to surrogate parenting 
agreements are adequately counseled and informed prior to en-
tering into the agreements. All parties will enter the agreements 
with full knowledge of their rights and responsibilities. Further-
more, if the agencies which arrange surrogate agreements are re-
quired to follow specified procedures, abuses of the process may 
be less likely to occur. 
Although a relatively small number of states have enacted 
surrogacy legislation during the last several years, many more 
have introduced such legislation or have established study com-
missions to examine the issue. Rather than leave the process of 
enacting surrogacy legislation to individual states, several legis-
lators advocate national legislation on this controversial subject. 
tion of their informed consent to the arrangement . . . . 
IV. No person or entity shall promote or in any other way so-
licit or induce for a fee, commission or other valuable consid-
eration, or with the intent or expectation of receiving the 
same, any party or parties to enter into a surrogacy 
arrangement. 
Additionally, mandatory terms for a surrogacy contract are set forth, including a provi-
sion that the surrogate has 72 hours after the birth of the child to decide to keep it. N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25 (Supp. 1990). 
15
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C. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
Whether or not surrogate parenting agreements should be 
legislated by Congress or by the individual state legislatures is 
another issue in the surrogacy debate. While state legislatures 
continue to examine or enact new legislation concerning surro-
gacy, several bills to prohibit surrogacy have been introduced in 
Congress.83 
One of the more recent bills on surrogacy introduced in 
Congress84 would make it a crime to enter into or act as an inter-
mediary in a commercial surrogacy arrangement.811 Furthermore, 
anyone who advertises the availability of a surrogate arrange-
ment is also subject to criminal sanctions.86 Although such legis-
lation bans commercial surrogacy, it does not address private, 
voluntary surrogacy arrangements.87 The enforceability of such 
agreements would be left to resolution by the judiciary.88 
Another recently introduced bill8D also concerns commercial 
surrogate arrangements. This bill essentially provides that such 
an agreement may not be enforced and prohibits brokering a 
commercialized childbearing agreement. DO 
Those advocating federal legislation of surrogate parenting 
agreements believe that if left to the individual State legisla-
tures, it will take years before a regulated or banned form of 
surrogacy is enacted by all the state legislatures.D1 Different laws 
in different states on this volatile issue may create further 
problems if infertile couples should decide to change residency 
83. H.R. 275, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1188, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); 
H.R. 2433, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). To date no new federal surrogacy legislation has 
been introduced in Congress. 
84. H.R. 275, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
85. Id. at 2. 
86. Id. at 2·3. 
87.Id. 
88. One commentator exposes the anomaly of a law which declares as void and un· 
enforceable a paid surrogacy agreement while at the same time a voluntary surrogacy 
agreement is enforceable. FIELD, supra note 1, at 23. 
89. H.R. 1188, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
90. Id. at 2-3. 
91. Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 2433 Before the Sub-
comm. on Transp., Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
16
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solely to hire a surrogate in a state which permits commercial-
ized childbearing. Interstate conflicts over this issue could erupt 
periodically as a result of geographically diverse laws.s2 
Legislation is needed to provide the judiciary with guidance 
in deciding surrogacy cases. Advocates of federal legislation wish 
to avoid uncertainties through the enactment of federal surro-
gacy laws. However, such legislation definitely lies within the 
realm of state legislatures.s3 Each state legislature can explore 
the issues surrounding surrogacy independently and implement 
laws reflecting its decided public policy. What is agreed upon is 
that legislation needs to be enacted. 
II. SURROGACY CASES 
A surprisingly small number of surrogacy cases have gone to 
triaP4 However, these illuminate the issues central to the surro-
gacy controversy. 
A. TRADITIONAL SURROGACY CASES 
By prohibiting the exchange of money in an adoption and 
similar proceedings, the Michigan Court of Appeals in Doe u. 
KelleyS5 denied a couple's claim that certain statutory provisions 
were unconstitutional. While the court recognized that the deci-
sion to bear or beget a child is a fundamental interest protected 
92. See Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of Laws, 1990 WIS. L. 
REV. 399 (analyzing four hypothetical fact situations involving two different jurisdictions; 
and discussing the means by which a restrictive state can deter the out-of-state conduct 
of those attempting to avoid local law). 
93. Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 2433 Before the Sub-
comm. on Transp., Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Family law matters such as adoption have tra-
ditionally been matters of State concern and the states can adopt laws suited to their 
own needs (statement of Bob Whittacker, member, Subcomm. on Transp., Tourism, and 
Hazardous Materials). 
94. There have been less than five cases in California during the past ten years in-
volving surrogate parenting arrangements, while the number of reported cases discovered 
in the United States is approximately ten. Using these estimates, approximately .01 % of 
California surrogacy arrangements and .0025% of all cases nationwide resulted in a legal 
dispute. MINORITY REPORT, supra note 2, at MI0. 
95. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), leaue to appeal denied, 414 Mich. 
875 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983). 
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by the right of privacy,96 that right is not a valid prohibition to 
state interference in such an agreement.97 The statute98 at issue 
prohibits payment in conjunction with use of adoption proce-
dures,99 although it does not directly prohibit the couple from 
having the child as planned. loo 
In Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Commonwealth 
ex ret. Armstrong,lOl the Supreme Court of Kentucky deter-
mined that a surrogate parenting procedure was not prohibited 
by then current law. Although an amended statutel02 prohibited 
the purchase of a child for adoption or any other purpose, in-
cluding termination of parental rights,103 the court held it did 
not apply to the surrogate parenting procedure because the 
agreement was entered into prior to conception. lo, However, a 
surrogate parenting agreement in Kentucky at that time was de-
termined to be voidable by the surrogate, pursuant to the termi-
nation of parental rights statute 1011 and the consent to adoption 
96. [d. at 173, 307 N.W.2d at 441. 
97. [d. 
98. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 710.54 (1967) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (555.54) (Calla-
ghan 1987)) provides: 
(1) Except for charges and fees approved by the court, a per-
son shall not offer, give, or receive any money or other consid-
eration or thing of value in connection with any of the 
following: 
(a) The placing of a child for adoption. 
(b) The registration, recording, or communication of the exis-
tence of a child available for adoption or the existence of a 
person interested in adopting a child. 
(c) A release. 
(d) A consent. 
(e) A petition. 
99. Doe, 106 Mich. App. at 170-74, 307 N.W.2d at 439, 441. 
100. [d. at 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441. 
101. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986). 
102. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1990): 
"No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may sell or purchase or procure for sale 
or purchase any child for the purpose of adoption or any other purpose, including termi-
nation of parental rights .... " 
103. Surrogate, 704 S.W.2d at 211. 
104. [d. (The court determined that Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1990) was intended to prevent baby brokers from coercing an ex-
pectant mother or parents of a child into relinquishing a child through financial 
inducement). 
105. [d. at 210. (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.601(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & 
Supp. 1990) prohibits filing a petition for voluntary termination of parental rights "prior 
to five (5) days after the birth of 8 child.") 
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statute. lOS Thus, while surroga~y contracts were voidable, they 
were not deemed illegal. l07 Ultimately the court correctly con-
cluded that this volatile issue of public policy should be resolved 
by legislation, not by the judiciary.l08 The two dissenting opin-
ions in this case viewed the surrogate parenting procedure at is-
sue as one involving the termination of parental rights in ex-
change for a monetary consideration, thus being no less than the 
sale of a child. lOS 
The New York Surrogate's Court of Nassau County deter-
mined in Adoption of Baby Girl L.J.llo that then current legisla-
tion did not expressly prohibit the use or compensation of surro-
gate mothers under surrogate parenting agreements. III Such 
arrangements were deemed to be voidable, although not void.ll2 
The court requested that the legislature review the practice of 
surrogate parenting and the payments involved to determine 
whether they should be permitted or prohibited through statu-
tory provisions. ll3 
In the landmark case of In re Baby M,1l4 the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey invalidated surrogacy contracts as being 
contrary to the law and public policy of the State.1lII Further-
more, it voided both the termination of the surrogate mother's 
parental rights l1S and the adoption of the child by the biological 
father's wife.ll7 
On the issue of parental rights, the court stated that the 
purpose and effect of the surrogacy contract was to give the fa-
106. Id. (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 
1990) specifies that a "consent to adoption" shall not "be held valid if such consent for 
adoption is given prior to the fifth day after the birth of the child"). 
107. Surrogate, 704 S.W.2d at 213. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (Ken-
tucky law now expressly prohibits commercial surrogate parenting agreements by declar-
ing them void and unenforceable and imposing criminal sanctions for violation of the 
statutes). 
108. Id. at 214. 
109. Id. at 214-15 (Vance, J., dissenting; Wintersheimer, J., dissenting). 
110. 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sur. Ct. 1986). 
111. Id. at 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 818. 
112. Id. at 977, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817. 
113. Id. at 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 818. 
114. 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). 
115. Id. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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ther exclusive right to the child. Therefore the surrogacy agree-
ment violated State policy because natural parents have equal 
rights concerning the child.1l8 
The court also discussed the commercial issues of surrogacy. 
It expressed the belief that money was being paid to obtain an 
adoption, and not for the personal services of the surrogate 
mother.Il9 
In Adoption of Paul,12O the New York Family Court in 
Kings County found that the language of New York's adoption 
statutes must be controlling to determine the legality of the sur-
rogate parenting agreement at issue.121 Although numerous sur-
rogacy bills were introduced in the New York Legislature,122 
ranging from complete prohibition to complex regulation, none 
passed prior to the decision in this case. Consequen~ly, the court 
looked to current state law governing adoption. 123 Compensation 
given to the surrogate mother directly for her "services" in con-
ceiving, carrying and giving birth to the child was not 
permitted.124 
The court concluded that the surrogate contract provided 
for the sale of a child, or at least the sale of a mother's right to 
her child, in direct contravention of the state's laws prohibiting 
payment for a child.12I! Consequently, such contracts were 
deemed to be void in the State of New York.126 The court's 
agreement to accept the mother's surrender of her child and 
subsequent termination of parental rights was conditioned upon 
all parties providing sworn affidavits that no compensation was 
118. [d. at 435, 537 A.2d at 1247. 
119. [d. at 424, 537 A.2d at 1241. 
120. 146 Misc. 2d 379, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Fam. Ct. 1990). 
121. [d. at 382, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 817. 
122. [d. 
123. New York's adoption laws prohibit the request, acceptance, receipt, payment, 
or gift of "any compensation or thing of value, directly or indirectly, in connection with 
the placing out or adoption of a child or for assisting a parent, relative or guardian of a 
child in arranging for the placement of the child for the purpose of adoption" by any 
person other than an authorized agency. N.Y. Soc. SERvo LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1983 
& Supp. 1991). [d. at 383, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 817. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. at 384·85, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 818. 
126. [d. 
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to be paid or accepted.127 The surrender of parental rights had 
to be truly voluntary and motivated solely by the child's best 
interests. Only then would the biological father and his wife be 
permitted to adopt the child.128 
Interwoven in the arguments presented in the cases are the 
most central issues of all. These concern the effect of surrogacy 
on society as a whole, and the effect specifically on our view of 
women and children within society. Proponents of surrogacy 
contend that it is a service, not a child, which is being provided 
and compensated. Most surrogacy contracts state that consider-
ation is for the services performed by the surrogate. This word-
ing is designed to prevent application of state adoption laws, 
which prohibit payment for a child. 
Proponents of surrogacy contend that a surrogate volunta-
rily enters into such a contract and should therefore be subject 
to its enforcement.129 However, opponents argue that it is ques-
tionable whether or not the decision to become a surrogate 
mother is actually "voluntary."13o Generally the fee paid to a 
surrogate mother is $10,000.131 To a woman who is economically 
disadvantaged, this standard fee may be a sufficient inducement 
to enter into such an agreement. Some have expressed concern 
that eventually women from third world countries will be hired 
as cheap labor to bear children for couples in the United 
States. 132 Regulation providing for a complete evaluation of po-
tential surrogates, including their motives and financial stability, 
should be required to ensure that the risk of exploitation is min-
imal. However, only those with substantial financial resources 
will be able to pursue this method of alternative reproduction, 
while the poor in society will remain at a disadvantage in their 
attempts to overcome infertility. As evidenced by the surrogacy 
cases and the underlying controversial issues, legislation is nec-
essary to determine the legality of surrogate parenting 
127. Id. at 385, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 819. 
128. Id. 
129. See Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate 
Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1954 (1986) [hereinafter Inalienable Rights]. 
130. SHANNON, supra note 17, at 49-65 (discussing coercive aspects of the new repro-
ductive technologies and the possibility that the financial gain may be "inducement, per-
haps undue, but not essentially coercive"). Id. at 65. 
131. STATE LEGIS. REP., supra note 3, at 1. 
132. G. COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 274 (1985). 
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agreements. 
B. GESTATIONAL SURROGACY CASE 
. The cases discussed thus far all involve traditional surro-
gacy.133 In California, a gestational surrogate motherl34 and the 
genetic father and mother each brought suit to establish legal 
parenthood in Johnson u. Caluert. m This case is one of first im-
pression for both California and the nation. 
1. Factual Background 
During the fall and winter of 1989-1990, Anna Johnson and 
a married couple, Mark and Crispina Calvert, met and discussed 
entering into an agreement whereby Johnson would serve as a 
gestational surrogate and carry the Calvert's fertilized embryol36 
to term. 137 The agreement provided for a payment of $10,000 to 
Johnson and stated that she would claim no interest in the 
child.138 On January 15, 1990, Anna Johnson signed an agree-
ment with Crispina and Mark Calvert, which provided that upon 
the child's birth Johnson would relinquish the child to the 
Calverts and would make no claim for parental rights. 13D 
On January 19, 1990, a fertilized embryo of the Calverts was 
implanted in Johnson. Ho She delivered a baby boy on Septem-
133. See supra note 1 (discussing traditional and gestational surrogacy). 
134. Id. 
135. Nos. X-633190, AD-57638 (Orange County Super. Ct., Decided Oct. 22, 1990), 
appeal filed, No. G010225 (Cal. Ct. App. March 15, 1991). (Johnson filed a complaint, 
dated August 13, 1990, for declaratory relief in superior court for a determination that 
she was the biological mother of the child, should be given custody of the child and be 
awarded damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation. The Cal verts brought 
suit seeking a declaration that they were the legal parents. The cases were consolidated). 
See L.A. Daily Journal, Sept. 27, 1990, at I, col. 4; TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 27, 1990, at 53: 
136. The procedure in this case involved an in vitro fertilization embryo transfer, in 
which the Calverts' egg and sperm were fertilized in vitro and subsequently implanted in 
Johnson for gestation. The National Law Journal, Nov. 5, 1990, at 3, col. 3. Crispina 
Calvert had had a hysterectomy and thus was unable to carry a child. 
137. Johnson v. Calvert, No. X633190 (Orange County Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1990), 
Reporter's Transcript, Statement of Decision, at 1481. 
138. Id. at 1481-82. 
139. Id. at 1482. 
140. Id. 
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ber 19, 1990.141 Chemical tests performed on all the parties and 
the child demonstrated that Johnson had no genetic relationship 
to the child, and that there was a 99.999 percent probability that 
the Cal verts were the genetic parents of the child.142 
After the birth of the child, an initial award of temporary 
custody was given to the Calverts and Johnson had visitation 
rights pending resolution of the controversy. 143 
2. The Trial Court Decision 
Judge Richard N. Parslow, Jr. found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Crispina and Mark Calvert were the genetic, biologi-
cal and natural parents of the child.144 
The most significant finding of Judge Parslow was that al-
though Johnson made a substantial contribution to the child, a 
surrogate carrying the genetic child146 of a couple does not ac-
quire parental rights. 146 He based his finding of no parental 
rights for Johnson on two approaches: That there are no paren-
tal rights in an in vitro fertilization case in which the surrogate 
is not genetically related to the child; and that even if there were 
parental rights, in this case they were relinquished in the con-
tract by the gestational carrier.147 He viewed Johnson's relation-
ship to the child as analogous to that of a foster parent who 
cares for a child during the period of time when the child's natu-
ral mother is unable to do SO.148 Therefore, upon the birth of the 
child, Crispina Calvert was able to assume the care of the 
child.149 
Secondly, Judge Parslow viewed gestational surrogacy con-
tracts in the in vitro fertilization cases as neither void nor 
against public policy.160 The contract was entered into by the 
141. [d. 
142. [d. 
143. L.A. Daily Journal, Nov. 1, 1990, at 5, col. 1. 
144. Johnson, at 1482-83. 
145. See supra note 136. 
146. Johnson, at 1485. 
147. [d. at 1487-88. 
148. [d. at 1483. 
149. [d. at 1484-85. 
150. [d. at 1489. 
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parties before implantation of the embryo and had a provision 
concerning relinquishment. lIi1 The trial court judge believed this 
provision was enforceable by either specific performance or ar-
guably even by habeas corpus. m He alluded to earlier case law 
on procreative rights, but stated that the procreative rights in-
volved in gestational surrogacy concern the right of the genetic 
mother, not the procreative right of the gestational mother!1I3 
Judge Parslow relied heavily on the testimony of one of the 
defendants' expert witnesses.1114 The expert testified that there is 
no clear evidence of emotional bonding between the child and 
the mother in the uterine environment. 11111 Furthermore, this ex-
pert testified that psychologically there is less likelihood for the 
person carrying the child to bond with the child, since the origi-
nal plan is that the child is the genetic child of another couple 
and will be raised by them exclusively.1116 
Finally, the trial court judge determined that a finding of 
three natural parents would not be in the best interests of the 
child. 1117 The judge found that this would be true in any in vitro 
fertilization case. IllS He discussed public policy problems if the 
child had three natural parents, such as bitter, protracted cus-
tody disputes. 1119 He also commented on the confusion which a 
three-parent arrangement would create for a child.160 
The judge made a number of recommendations to the state 
legislature.161 First, he suggested that intensive psychological 
evaluation of the parties should be conducted, arguably by an 
151. [d. 
152. [d. 
153. [d. at 1493-94. 
154. [d. at 1487. Dr. Call testified regarding bonding between the child and the 
mother during gestation. 
155. [d. The judge conceded that "[T)here may be and usually is and often is a 
bonding between a person carrying the child and the child. That's not universal, but it 
does happen." [d. . 
156. [d. at 1490. But see M. KLAUS, MATERNAL-INFANT BONDING, at 45 (1976) (argu-
ing there is evidence that women begin to feel attached to the child during pregnancy). 
He states that "[s)ignificant affectional bonding had been established by the time of or 
soon after the birth of the child." [d. at '46. 
157. Johnson, at 1492. 
158. [d. 
159. [d. at 1488. 
160. [d. at 1492. 
161. [d. at 1494-97. 
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independent agency.162 Second, he would require that the ge-
netic mother be unable medically to carry a child to term.163 
Third, that it should be completely clear prior to implantation 
for in vitro fertilization cases that all the parties understand 
that the child will go to the genetic parents immediately after 
birth, and that the surrogate will have no parental rights. 164 
Fourth, the surrogate should have previously carried at least one 
child to term, to assist the surrogate in the decision-making 
process.165 
Judge Parslow saw no problem with a surrogate receiving a 
fee, payment being for the pain and suffering involved with car-
rying a child to term.166 He stated that a baby is not being sold, 
only the pain and suffering that goes with carrying a child to 
term is being compensated.167 
3. Analysis of Johnson v. Calvert 
As the first legal custody case involving gestational surro-
gacy, Johnson v. Calvert raises additional issues not previously 
addressed in traditional surrogacy cases. It also illustrates the 
need for legislation in California encompassing all potential 
third-party assisted childbearing methods}68 Since Judge Pars-
low's decision specifically addressed gestational surrogacY,169 it 
may prove to have insubstantial persuasive value for future 
traditional surrogacy cases. 170 
The superior court decision awarding sole legal and physical 
custody of the child to the Calverts was based upon three cen-
162. [d. at 1494. 
163. [d. at 1495. This would be to ensure that women able to carry a child, but not 
wishing to interrupt career plans or to endure pregnancy, would not be able to enter into 
a surrogacy arrangement. 
164. [d. 
165. [d. at 1497. (This recommendation for legislation is without validity, since an 
equal protection argument can be raised and it does not acknowledge a childless wo-
man's ability to make a decision regarding surrogacy). 
166. [d. at 1499. 
167. [d. 
168. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing S.B. 937 introduced 
by Senator Watson, which attempts to include all potential third-party assisted 
childbearing methods). 
169. Johnson, at 1492. 
170. See supra notes 95-128 and accompanying text. 
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tral findings l7l that require analysis. 
a. Parental Rights of the Parties 
Judge Parslow determined that a surrogate carrying the ge-
netic child of a couple does not acquire parental rights. 172 He 
essentially established that genetic contribution should be given 
priority over gestational contribution.178 Until recent history, ge-
netic connection was the sole means of determining natural bio-
logical parenthood.174 That the gestational relationship in John-
son was not given legal recognition1711 is therefore not surprising. 
However, one can argue that the gestational carrier is also a 
natural parent. 176 During pregnancy, there is a unique physiolog-
ical relationship between the fetus and the gestational mother.177 
171. First, that a surrogate carrying the genetic child of a couple does not acquire 
parental rights; second, gestational surrogacy contracts are not void nor against public 
policy and Anna Johnson relinquished her parental rights when she executed such a con-
tract; and third, it is in the best interests of the child not to have three natural parents. 
Johnson, at 1485-92. 
172. Id. at 1485. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of 
Southern California, at 8-10, Johnson v. Calvert (Orange County Super. Ct., Decided 
Oct. 22, 1990) (No. X633190) [hereinafter ACLU Brief) (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 
U.S. 248, 258-62 (1983) for the proposition that in determining parental rights, biological 
connection is not the exclusive factor). ACLU Brief, at 8. 
173. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (the Court recognized that the pri-
vate interest of a man in the children he has sired and raised warrants protection). Id. at 
651. (Quoting Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), the court in Stanley stated 
that the "rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed essential"). Id. 
174. In some instances genetics is deemed not to establish parental rights. CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 7005(b} (West 1988) provides: "[T]he donor of semen provided to a licensed 
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is 
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." See 
ACLU Brief, supra note 172, at 8 & n.3. 
175. Johnson, at 1485. 
176. Shultz, Reproductiue Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportu-
nity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 332 [hereinafter Intent-Based 
ParenthoodJ(arguing that "[t]here is no persuasive basis for a categorical preference for 
either a gestational contributor or a genetic contributor to receive exclusive recognition 
as 'mother' "). See also Inalienable Rights, supra note 129, at 1951-52 (a gestational 
carrier would have a strong claim as a biological mother); Annas, Redefining Parenthood 
and Protecting Embryos: Why We Need New Laws, THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Oct. 
1984, at 50 (arguing that the legal presumption that the gestational mother is the legal 
mother should remain, thus recognizing "the biological fact that the gestational mother 
has contributed more of herself to the child than the genetic mother"). Id. at 51. 
177. M. YOUNG, IMMUNOLOGY OF PREGNANCY AND ITS DISORDERS (1989). ("The envi-
ronment of the fetus is a reflection of maternal health and nutrition.") Id. at 23. See M. 
ADINOLFI, IMMUNOLOGY OF PREGNANCY AND ITs DISORDERS (1989). See also ACLU Brief, 
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Nevertheless, Judge Parslow ruled that only a genetic connec-
tion warrants legal recognition in gestational surrogacy.178 
b. Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts 
Superior Court Judge Richard Parslow further found that 
even if there were parental rights, they were previously relin-
quished by the gestational carrier pursuant to the surrogacy con-
tract.179 He determined that gestational contracts in the in vitro 
fertilization cases are neither void nor against public policy.180 
He alluded to constitutional rights that would be infringed upon 
if all surrogacy contracts were declared illegal. 181 
Proponents of surrogacy assert that fundamental rights pro-
tected by both the federal Constitution and the California Con-
stitution support the right to enter into surrogacy arrangements. 
Most notably, the right of privacy is expressly guaranteed by the 
California Constitution,182 and includes a right of procreative 
choice.183 
Since the California Constitution expressly recognizes a 
right to privacy, it is considered broader than the federal right 
to privacy184 and has been interpreted as a document of inde-
pendent force. m The United States Supreme Court and the Cal-
supra note 172, at 9. 
178. Judge Parslow conceded that Anna Johnson had made a "substantial contribu-
tion" to the child, but her role as the gestational carrier was insufficient to warrant rec-
ognition as a natural parent. Johnson, at 1485. 
179. [d. at 1487-88. 
180. [d. at 1489. 
181. [d. at 1493. 
182. See supra note 38. The right to privacy is only implied by the 14th Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 
U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
183. Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 
172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981). ("The fundamental right at issue is the right to private procre-
ative choice free from governmental interference.") [d. at 288, 625 P.2d at 801, 172 Cal. 
Rptr. at 888; People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969) 
(first recognizing the Constitutional right of procreative choice in California); American 
Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1989). 
184. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 839,263 
Cal. Rptr. at 49. 
185. [d. The court in American Academy of Pediatrics stated that "[tlhe California 
Supreme Court recognized its authority 'to construe the California Constitution to pro-
vide protection beyond that afforded by parallel provisions of the federal document.' " 
[d. at 841, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (quoting People v. Teresinski, 30 Cal. 3d 822, 827, 640 
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ifornia Supreme Court have repeatedly acknowledged a right of 
privacy or liberty in matters related to marriage and family.186 
Additionally, the fundamental right of parenting has been recog-
nized by the California courts, and is only disturbed in extreme 
cases of neglect or abandonment.187 
The constitutionally protected freedom of association188 also 
supports the right of persons to enter into surrogacy arrange-
ments. The relationships entitled to this constitutional protec-
tion are those concerning the creation and sustenance of a fam-
ily.189 Thus the fundamental right of intimate association has 
been recognized by the Court as encompassing the right to make 
procreative choices.19o 
These constitutionally recognized rights support the pro-
position that individuals should be free to enter into surrogacy 
arrangements. Yet whether a surrogacy contract should be en-
forced or considered void as against public policy requires fur-
ther analysis. 
In upholding the surrogacy contract in Johnson,l9l Judge 
Parslow emphasized that it contained a provision regarding re-
linquishment, and that the agreement was entered into before 
the embryo was implanted.192 He also pointed out that Anna 
Johnson knew she had to give the child to the Calverts upon its 
P.2d 753, 755, 180 Cal. Rptr. 617, 619 (1982}). 
186. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 486, 500 (1965); Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541 (1942); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P. 2d 
194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969). 
187. In re Carma leta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 489, 579 P. 2d 514, 518, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 
627 (1978). 
188. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-20 (1983). The Court 
stated: 
[T)he Court has concluded that choices to enter into and 
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be se-
cured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role 
of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom 
that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, 
freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental el-
ement of personal liberty. 
[d. at 617-18. 
189. [d. at 619. 
190. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'I, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (childbirth). See 
ACLU Brief, supra note 172, at 5-6. 
191. Johnson, at 1489. 
192. [d. 
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birth,193 and that this was in accord with the expectations of the 
parties to the agreement. 194 
At the time of signing the surrogacy agreement, all the par-
ties to the contract intended that the Calverts would have exclu-
sive custody of the child upon its birth. 1911 A custody determina-
tion based upon the intent of the partiesl96 is one method of 
both resolving disputes involving third-party assisted childbear-
ing and of legislating surrogacy.197 
Opponents of surrogacy contend that the state has a com-
pelling interest against enforcement of commercial surrogacy 
agreements.19S Claims of commodification and exploitation arise. 
Underlying the commodification argument is the fear that chil-
dren and surrogate mothers will be viewed as a means to an-
other's end.199 Yet permitting the exchange of money in new re-
productive arrangements does not automatically result in 
commodifying both children and women.200 Already donors in 
other reproductive techniques, such as artificial insemination 
and ovum donation, are compensated. To compensate a surro-
gate is an extension of the recognition for a donor's contribution. 
Exploitation of women is another expressed fear of oppo-
nents of surrogacy. Yet one commmentator argues that exploita-
tion of women is actually perpetuated when women are unable 
to gain monetary recognition for things uniquely achieved by 
193. Id. at 1485. 
194. Id. 1490. 
195. Id. at 1489-90. 
196. Intent-Based Parenthood, supra note 176, at 323. ("Within the context of arti-
ficial reproductive techniques, intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express 
and bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood.") 
197. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing recently introduced 
legislation in California). 
198. A number of commentators have addressed the negative ramifications of surro-
gacy. See SHANNON, supra note 17; Recht, "M" is for Money: Baby M and the Surrogate 
Motherhood Controversy, 37 AM. V.L. REV. 1013, 1020-28 (1988). 
199. Krimmel, The Case Against Surrogate Parenting, THE HASTINGS CENTER RE-
PORT, Oct. 1983, at 35 (arguing that it is unethical to separate the decision to create 
children from the desire to have them. By creating a child without desiring it may cause 
children to be viewed as commodities or items of manufacture). Id. at 36-37. 
200. See Intent-Based Parenthood, supra note 176, at 334-37. ("The critical issue is 
not whether something involves monetary exchange as one of its aspects, but whether it 
is treated as reducible solely to its monetary features.") Id. at 336. 
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women.201 Furthermore, monetary concerns only seem to surface 
when women and children are involved.202 
Nevertheless, there are important concerns raised in com-
pensating surrogates. One concern is that the decision to become 
a surrogate may not in fact be voluntary. This potential arises 
when a surrogate's choice becomes involuntary due to personal 
circumstances of hardship, such that no choice actually exists. 
However, these fears can be allayed if sufficient precautions are 
undertaken. 
Prior to entering into a surrogate agreement, a surrogate 
should be determined to be financially stable and independently 
represented by an attorney to ensure that her decision to be a 
surrogate is voluntary. Professional counseling should be under-
gone by all the parties to a surrogacy agreement. A surrogate 
also should be informed, orally and in writing, of her rights and 
responsibilities as a surrogate, and should consent in writing evi-
dencing her intent. By completing these procedures a substan-
tial amount of time before undergoing any insemination or in 
vitro procedures, the surrogate will have time to consider all of 
the negative ramifications of entering into a surrogacy agree-
ment. If all of the above precautions are taken, it is more likely 
that a surrogate will be sufficiently informed to decide whether 
or not to enter into a surrogacy arrangement. Basing custody de-
cisions upon the intent of the parties alone, however, may prove 
to be detrimental to the best interests of the child. 
c. Best Interests of the Child 
Judge Parslow's decision awarding sole legal and physical 
custody of the child to the Calverts was in part based upon a 
determination of the best interests of the child. He believed 
there were public policy problems with a child having three 
parents.203 
In determining custody, the courts should consider more 
than the intent of the parties. The best interests of the child 
201. [d. at 336. 
202. [d. at 337. 
203. Johnson, at 1492. 
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should also be addressed.204 For an infant, it is manifestly im-
portant to ensure continuity in the child's life.2OII Continuity 
should be used as a guideline by the courts.206 
By taking into account the best interests of the child, the 
adult's interests are consequently subordinated in favor of the 
child's interests. However, since surrogacy arrangements do not 
consider a child's best interests, it is imperative that in a cus-
tody dispute, courts address the best interests of the child. As in 
the Johnson case, a guardian ad litem protects a child's best 
interests contrasted to the interests asserted by the adults in a 
surrogacy custody dispute. 
In Johnson, the final decision by the trial court judge to 
place the child with the Calverts, and to deny visitation rights to 
Johnson, reflects a best interest determination for the child. The 
decision to permit only one adult to act as the "psychological 
mother" was an attempt to eliminate confusion and uncertainty 
in the child's life. Despite the harsh consequences of such a deci-
sion on the surrogate in this case, the decision to award sole le-
gal and physical custody to one set of parents was in the best 
interests of the child. 
CONCLUSION 
As new reproductive technologies become available, laws 
must be enacted to address them. Without legislation on the 
204. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOL NIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD (2d ed. 1979)[hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS]. (Claiming that "[w]hile 
they make the interests of a child paramount over all other claims when his physical 
well-being is in jeopardy, they subordinate, often intentionally, his psychological well-
being to ... an adult's right to assert a biological tie"). [d. at 4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4608 
(West 1988) provides in relevant part: "In making a determination of the best interest of 
the child . . . the court shall, among other factors it finds relevant, consider all of the 
following: (a) The health, safety, and welfare of the child." 
205. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS. supra note 204, at 18, 32. ("When there are 
changes of parent figure or other hurtful interruptions, the child's vulnerability and the 
fragility of the relationship becomes evident.") [d. at 18. Change of the caretaking person 
for infants also affects the course of their emotional development. [d. at 32. 
206. [d. at 34. "The implications for this guideline for the laws on ... custody are 
that each child placement be final and unconditional and that pending final placement a 
child must not be shifted to accord with each tentative decision." [d. at 35. However, if 
this continuity guideline is followed by the courts, the longer a child remains in an 
adult's custody pending appeal, the less likely the court will allow the other party to 
obtain custody. [d. at 46. 
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subject, the judiciary is left to the task of interpreting current 
statutory law. Most of these laws were not drafted with any con-
sideration of surrogacy. . 
Additionally, the interests of surrogate mothers, infertile 
couples and intermediaries must be weighed against societal 
concerns. To address these potentially competing values, legisla-
tion regulating commercial surrogacy in California should be en-
acted. Regulations requiring intensive counseling and evalua-
tions of prospective surrogates and parents will minimize 
exploitation of those involved. Potential surrogates should be in-
dependently represented by counsel to ensure voluntary choice 
and to eliminate the potential for conflict of interest. Licensing 
of surrogate intermediaries will ensure adherence to uniform 
standards throughout the whole process. Rather than criminaliz-
ing those involved in surrogate parenting agreements, regulation 
of the practice will recognize individual procreative choice while 
at the same time minimize any risks of exploitation or of driving 
the practice underground. 
While the intent of the parties in a surrogacy agreement 
should be considered by the judiciary in establishing custody, 
also employing a best interest determination will preserve soci-
ety's fundamental value of putting the child's interests first, 
rather than those of the adult parties. 
POSTSCRIPT 
On appeal the California Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling of the trial court in 
Anna J. u. Mark C.I07 The court held that under the Uniform Parentage Actio. and the 
Evidence Code,'o. the wife and husband were the natural mother and father of the child. 
The court held that the question of maternity as determined under section 895 of 
the Evidence Code confirms who is the "natural" mother of the child .... As the blood 
tests excluded Anna from being the natural mother and because Anna had stipulated 
that Crispina is genetically related to the child, the court found that the trial court's 
determination that Crispina is the natural mother should be upheld.1Il 
The court of appeal found that the designation of natural parent status to the ge-
netic parents did not violate the gestational surrogate's due process and equal protection 
207. 234 Cal. App. 3d 1557, 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1991). The case is now pending 
before the California Supreme Court. 
208. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7000 et seq. (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). 
209. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 621, 895 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). 
210. Anna J. v. Mark C., 234 Cal. App. at 1567, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 376. 
211. Id. 
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rights .... The court also stated that it was not necessary to decide whether the contract 
is enforceable in this case .... 
212. Id. at 1572-76, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 378-81. 
213. Id. at 1576-77, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 381. 
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